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Global Venue Controls Are Coming: A
Reply to Professor LoPucki
by
Honorable Samuel L. Bufford*
International venue shopping is developing for transnational insolvency
cases,' Professor Lynn LoPucki contends, and it will lead to bad conse-
quences. 2 The cause of such venue shopping, he says, is a universalist view-
point that underlies recent developments governing the coordination of
international insolvency cases. 3 He argues that the world economy would
benefit if the rules governing international insolvencies were guided instead
by his vision of cooperative territorialism. 4 Professor LoPucki argues that
legal developments such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency (the "Model Law"),5 the European Union Regulation on Insol-
vency Proceedings (the "EU Regulation"), 6 the NAFTA Principles of Coop-
*U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Central District of California; Nomura Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law
School (winter 2005). B.A., Wheaton College, 1964; Ph.D., University of Texas, 1969; J.D., University of
Michigan, 1973. © Samuel L. Bufford; all rights reserved.
'For the purposes of this Article, the terms "insolvency case- and "bankruptcy case" are used inter-
changeably. There is a divide in the literature on how to refer to a court proceeding relating to an
insolvency. The U.S. bankruptcy law consistently refers to a bankruptcy "case." Much of the interna-
tional literature, on the other hand, refers to a "proceeding." Compare, e.g., In re Manning, 236 B.R. 14
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999) (referring to domestic insolvency proceedings as a "bankruptcy case"), with Com-
mission Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1, as amended (regulating all
international insolvency or bankruptcy matters within the European community).
2See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005), ch. 8, reprinted as Global and Out of Control?, 79 AM. BANKR. LJ. 79,
(2005) (hereinafter "Global and Out of Control"); see also Professor LoPucki's reply to this paper, Lynn M.
LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. LJ. 143 (2005) (hereinafter "Universalism Unravels").
'See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 2, at 79-83.
'Professor LoPucki develops his "cooperative territorialism" view in two prior articles. See Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Ban.kruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216
(2000) (hereinafter "Cooperative Territoriality"); Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bank-
ruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999) (hereinafter "Cooperation in Inter-
national Bankruptcy").
'MODEL LAW ON CRoss-BoRDER INSOLVENCY (1997); see also Guide to Enactment of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 1997 XXVIII UNCITRAL Y.B. pt. 3, § 2, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/442, reprinted in 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415 (1998); see generally Andr6 J. Berends, The
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 309 (1998).
6Commission Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 Oj. (L 160) 1, as amended; see
also Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: An Overview and Com-
ment, with U.S. Interest in Mind, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 25 (1997).
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eration in Transnational Insolvency Cases ("NAFTA Principles"),7 and
domestic laws such as § 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code8 promote a modi-
fied universalist approach to international insolvency cases.9 According to
Professor LoPucki, the elimination of a local court's discretion to deny the
enforcement of a foreign bankruptcy order would result in international fo-
rum shopping.10 Professor LoPucki contends that the promotion of interna-
tional venue shopping is among the worst of the evils of universalism because
it has the potential for causing more economic harm than domestic forum
shopping.
Professor LoPucki's article comes from his new book, Courting Failure."
The remainder of the book concerns domestic venue shopping and is based on
Professor LoPucki's database of information on large publicly held companies
that have filed bankruptcy since October 1, 1979 (when the present Bank-
ruptcy Code went into force). In contrast, the materials on international
insolvency lack the same moorings in empirical evidence.
I disagree with Professor LoPucki's view that universalism is bad. In my
view, territorialism is much worse, and I support the effort to replace it with
a modified version of universalism. While none of the legal regimes to which
Professor LoPucki refers embodies a pure universalist view,12 they do all
adopt something close to modified universalism. I argue that an international
legal regime based on a modified universalist viewpoint can bring us much
closer to the appropriate administration of international insolvency cases than
territorialism. History shows that Professor LoPucki's proposal for a "modi-
fled" version of territorialism is altogether unworkable.
I agree with Professor LoPucki that the unregulated version of universal-
ism of recent years can lead to courts deciding to keep cases that should be
sent to the courts of another country.' 3 In my view, a lack of structured
rules governing the venue of transnational insolvency cases is responsible for
this development. While the Model Law and the EU Regulation are quite
'Transnational Insolvency Project: Principles of Cooperation in Transnational Insolvency Cases
Among the Members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (2003) . I do not discuss substan-
tially here the NAFTA Principles, because they are not presently in force anywhere, and the adoption of
the important provisions for venue purposes depends primarily on implementing legislation that has not
been adopted and is not presently pending.
Sll U.S.C. § 304 (2005).
9See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 2, at 86-89:
"°See id. at 79.
I"LYNN M. LoPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR Bic CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) (hereinafter 'COURTING FAILURE").
12In contrast, the International Bar Association's Committee J Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat
adopts a view that is much closer to a pure universalist position. See Int'l Bar Ass'n, Comm. J Cross-
Border Insolvency Concordat, Sept. 17, 1995 (see especially Principle 1), reprinted in SAMUEL L. BUFFORD
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, Appendix A (2001).
"See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 2, at 80-81.
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different, the principal purpose of both is to impose a structure on venue
decisions in insolvency cases with international dimensions. They need sev-
eral modest improvements to further reduce the opportunities for unwise in-
ternational forum shopping.
The venue rules in the EU Regulation and the Model Law are largely
untested. In no reported case yet has the location of the main case been
governed by any domestic version of the Model Law. There are a substantial
number of non-controversial cases under the EU Regulation. Daisytek and
Eurofood, which I discuss infra, are the main controversial cases. I do not
defend venue decisions in international cases in the absence of the rules im-
posed by the Model Law or the EU Regulation. The important news is that
the Model Law and the EU Regulation will make important changes in the
venue decisions in transnational insolvency cases, and § 304 will disappear.
I defend the rules under the Model Law and the EU Regulation with
three qualifications. First, both the Model Law and the EU Regulation need
to separate the decision to open an insolvency case from the determination of
when an insolvency case is a main case, 14 and to provide different time frames
for making these decisions. Further, the determination that a case is a main
case should only be made after notice to the parties in interest. Second, both
the Model Law and the EU Regulation should be amended to provide that
main cases for the economically integrated entities in a corporate group may
all be located in the same venue. As presently structured, both the Model
Law and the EU Regulation require the treatment of each legal entity sepa-
rately for the purpose of determining the location of its center of main inter-
ests (hereinafter "COMI"), which in turn determines the proper location of
its main insolvency case. This needs modification, in my view, to permit the
reorganization or liquidation of an entire economic unit, which will be more
efficient than dealing with its corporate parts separately.
15
Third, I recommend a "residency" rule like that in the United States, 16
which would require that an international business enterprise have its
COMI in a country for a minimum period of time before qualifying to file a
"4A "main case" is one that should or must be recognized by courts of other countries. See infra notes
94-100 and accompanying text. The Model Law and the EU Regulation should also separate the granting
of any "first day" orders from the determination of whether a case should be recognized by courts of other
countries. See discussion in text accompanying notes 197-203 infra.
"5This presumption should be rebuttable in a particular case. In fact, a decision to split off a corporate
subsidiary for liquidation or reorganization in a different national venue may come later in a case, such as
when it appears that an economic unit should be reorganized but that a particular entity should be ex-
cluded from the reorganization. At this point, if the entity is located abroad, it may be more efficient to
deal with it in its home country, and its case should be transferred there pursuant to whatever procedure
may be available.
i"See infra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
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domestic enterprise-wide bankruptcy case. While this rule change would not
prohibit venue shopping, it would make such shopping more difficult.
Unlike Professor LoPucki, I endorse the recent adoption of the domestic
version of the Model Law as Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The
Model Law has already been adopted in a number of other major countries,
including Japan, Canada and Mexico, and its adoption in England is expected
imminently. 17 It is time for the United States to join its trading partners in a
legal regime that will better coordinate international insolvency cases.18
The remainder of this Article details my disagreements with Professor
LoPucki. Part I discusses universalism and territorialism,19 especially the
modified version of universalism that I support. Part II examines the interna-
tional venue provisions of the Model Law and the EU Regulation. Part III
introduces the relevant venue shopping cases. Only two groups of cases are
relevant for the purposes of this paper: the French and German subsidiaries of
Daisytek, and Eurofood (a subsidiary of Parmalat SpA, the Italian conglomer-
ate). None of the other cases that Professor LoPucki discusses was subject to
the venue provisions of either the EU Regulation or the Model Law. Part
IV explains the amendments that I believe are needed for the EU Regulation
and the Model Law to deal more effectively with venue decisions, and dis-
cusses how these changes would affect the venue decisions in Eurofood and
the continental Daisytek subsidiaries. Finally, Part V contains concluding
remarks.
I. UNIVERSALISM AND TERRITORIALISM
Universalism and territorialism are the two dominant theories of how
bankruptcy laws should be structured to deal with international business in-
solvencies. The traditional approach is territorialism, where "the courts in
each national jurisdiction seize the property physically within their control
and distribute it according to local rules."20 In contrast, universalism in its
pure form takes the view that all bankruptcy assets and claims should be
resolved in the debtor's "home country" under the laws of that country.
2'
Modified universalism takes the view that a non-home country court may
open a secondary insolvency case to supplement the home country dominant
7 Other countries that have adopted the Model Law include Poland, Romania, South Africa, Thailand,
Serbia, Montenegro and Eritrea. Adoption is pending in New Zealand.
sAs an additional benefit, international venue shopping will be more difficult under this proposed
regime.9 Universalism and territorialism are often respectively referred to as "universality" and
territoriality."
2 Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2177,
2179 (2000); see also, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 513 (1991).
"See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 20, at 2179.
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case for a debtor.22 In the absence of a secondary case, the modified univer-
salist view agrees with pure universalism that the entire case should be ad-
ministered under the local law of the venue (except to the extent that choice
of law rules lead to the application of foreign law).
Universalism has developed a specialized terminology. The dominant
case in the "home country" is called the "main" case or proceeding.23 A case
in any other country is called a "secondary" 24 or "non-main" 25 case or pro-
ceeding. This terminology is unnecessary under the territorialist view; for a
territorialist, every case is a main case within the country where it is filed,
and each case has little effect outside that country.
None of the problems of either territorialism or universalism would arise
if bankruptcy laws did not exist.26 However, every country except Ghana
has a bankruptcy law of some kind.27 In addition, neither Professor LoPucki
nor I take the view that bankruptcy laws should generally be repealed. We
agree that bankruptcy laws are important to provide for the orderly liquida-
tion or reorganization of businesses.28  Our disagreement in these papers
29
centers on the theory behind how such laws should be designed to administer
insolvency cases that extend beyond national borders.
A general examination of the problems of territorialism or the benefits of
universalism is beyond the scope of this paper. Both Professor LoPucki 30 and
I agree that neither territorialism nor universalism is a perfect solution to the
problems that bankruptcy laws are designed to address. Our disagreement
arises because he contends that a modified version of territorialism provides
the best available solution to the administration of international bankruptcies,
"Modified universalism is the version that I and virtually all other defenders of universalism follow-
especially in the current international state of economic and legal development.
"See, e.g., Model Law, art. 2(b) (defining "foreign main proceeding"); EU Regulation, art. 3.4 (authoriz-
ing the opening of a secondary proceeding before a main proceeding in certain circumstances).
24See, e.g., EU Regulation, art. 3.3. I use the term secondary" to refer to all non-main cases.
"See Model Law, art. 2(c).
2 For a discussion of how businesses would be reorganized or liquidated without a bankruptcy system,
see Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1987).
"7While Ghana has drafted a bankruptcy law, it has yet to adopt one. See Insolvency Bill, GPC/
A231/300/5/2001 (on file with author).
"The discussion of universalism and territorialism has developed almost exclusively in the domain of
business bankruptcy. While virtually every country has a business bankruptcy law, consumer bankruptcy
laws only exist in relatively few countries. In addition, the international dimensions of consumer cases
raise issues beyond the scope of this discussion.
"I have other disagreements with Professor LoPucki as to the themes of the other chapters of COURT-
ING FAILURE; however, these issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
"Professor LoPucki's modified territorial views are explained more fully in two previous articles. See
LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 4, at 2216; LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 4, at 696. This paper draws liberally from Professor LoPucki's elaboration of his views
in those pieces.
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while I contend that a modified version of universalism provides a much bet-
ter solution.
The problems that Professor LoPucki identifies do not arise from univer-
salism, but from its imperfect development in bankruptcy law and practice
today. While territorialism would mitigate such problems by preventing
some of them from occurring, the cure is far worse than the disease.
A. UNIVERSALISM
Universalism comes in two forms: pure universalism and modified univer-
salism. The pure form is idealistic, and is altogether impractical in a world
with differing legal regimes, differing political and economic systems, differing
court systems, and differing levels of realization of the rule of law.
Universalism yields a variety of benefits. These include a more efficient
ex ante allocation of capital, reduced administrative costs due to a reduction
in the number of proceedings, facilitated reorganizations, substantially in-
creased liquidation value, and greater clarity and certainty to all parties in
interest in most circumstances.
31
1. Pure Universalism
In its pure form, universalism would have a single insolvency regime that
is coextensive with the global economic structure, and that would govern all
international insolvency cases. Under such a regime, there would be one
main insolvency case for each business entity that would administer all of the
entity's assets worldwide.32 That forum would manage the case, collect the
assets, regulate a reorganization, and provide for the payment of creditors. 33
Similarly situated creditors in all countries would be treated equally. The
case would be governed by a single legal regime governing the substantive
rights of the parties in interest, which would eliminate conflicts among appli-
cable laws that could vary the rights of either the creditors or the debtor and
its owners.3 4 The case would also be governed by one set of procedural rules
31See generally, Kent Anderson, The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: a Defense of the Modified
Universal Approach Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L, 679, 687-94 (2000);
Lucian A. Bebchuck & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L.
& EcON. 775, 778 (1999); Guzman, supra note 20, at 2179; Robert K. Rassmussen, A New Approach to
Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-10 (1997); Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models
for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM. J. COMP. LAw 573, 575-76 (1993); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A
Global Solution to International Default, 98 MiCH. L. REv. 2276, 2292-98 (2000); Jay Lawrence West-
brook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 457, 465 (1991); Westbrook, supra note 20, at 514-15.
32See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2292-93; Traut-
man, supra note 31, at 575-76.
3 See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2292-93; Traut-
man, supra note 31, at 575-76.
3"See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2292-97.
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that would provide for its commencement or opening, its administration and
its closing.
The case for pure universalism is easy to state in economic terms.35 As a
general rule, economic transactions are most efficient and create the greatest
economic value when they are unencumbered with transaction costs. 36 Debt
collection inherently involves transaction costs. Bankruptcy systems are de-
signed to reduce these collection costs through collective action. 37 However,
multiple bankruptcy cases tend to defeat the benefits of collective action by
multiplying the costs of participation and administration.38 Thus the collec-
tive ideal is best achieved where a single main insolvency case handles every-
thing that needs to be done to protect creditors, to reorganize or to liquidate
business, to protect jobs, and to provide for an orderly and economical admin-
istration of the case. Furthermore, such a system decreases lending costs and
does not skew investment choices. 39 In addition, a single court would im-
prove dramatically the possibility of reorganization 4° and the preservation of
the going concern value of an international business group.
Transaction costs are particularly problematic for international bankrupt-
cies. Multiple insolvency cases in several countries for the same debtor dupli-
cate transaction costs and vastly decrease economic efficiency. In addition,
where languages are different, the costs of translation further reduce effi-
ciency. Differences in legal systems also add substantial costs because the
decision makers must educate themselves in the laws of every country in-
volved. In sum, multiple bankruptcy cases in different countries multiply the
transaction costs of bankruptcy enormously,41 and justify substantial efforts
to harmonize such cases.
2. Modified Universalism
We do not live in a world with a single insolvency regime, or even with
closely aligned regimes. Each country has its own insolvency system, and the
differences are often dramatic.
Two examples illustrate the difference in insolvency systems. The
French insolvency law, adopted in 1985, presumes that a business should be
reorganized, not liquidated,42 and bankruptcy cases are normally initiated as
"For a defense of pure universalism, see Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-
Border Corporate Insolvencies, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL. 787 (2000).
3
6See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 31, at 27.
"7See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOcIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 5 (1986).
"8See Perkins, supra note 35, at 805-06.
39See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 31, at 27; Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 31, at 778.
4 See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2293.
41See, e.g., In re Board of Dirs. Of Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486, 522 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
42See C. COM., art. L. 620-1. However, a 1994 amendment permits the court to order immediate
liquidation where business has ceased or rescue is manifestly impossible.
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reorganizations. 43 The goals of the French insolvency system, in order, are
"(1) permitting the survival of businesses, the preservation of employees and
employment, and (2) the discharge of their liabilities."44 The third statutory
priority, the payment of creditors, is a goal that often is not reached.45 In
contrast, the German insolvency law presumes that a business should be liq-
uidated, not reorganized, and a reorganization is undertaken only if the credi-
tors choose this route after the insolvency administrator reports on the
debtor's economic situation.
46
Modified universalism shares the view that there should be a single main
case for an international business in its home country, governed for the most
part by the laws of the home country. However, modified universalism rec-
ognizes that the main case may need support through secondary or ancillary
cases in other countries where assets are located or local court support is
otherwise needed. 47 A local court, under this view, normally applies domes-
tic law to its proceedings, and it retains the discretion to evaluate the fairness
of home country procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors
where appropriate.48
Modified universalism recognizes that the substantive rights of the par-
ties in interest in an insolvency case may differ substantially, depending on
the country where the insolvency case is filed. To participate in a foreign
case, creditors must learn the applicable procedures, must often hire local
counsel to protect their rights, and must often deal with language differences.
Where legal systems are different, the economic analysis is more complex
for modified universalism than for pure universalism. In calculating expected
economic benefits, parties are assumed to take into account the legal systems
and rules that will likely govern how their transactions are carried out and
the benefits are allocated. In addition, the parties must evaluate the risks
undertaken, including how these risks will be handled under the applicable
legal system. If it is uncertain what legal system will govern the risks, it is
difficult to quantify them. Where the distribution rules of legal systems are
different, the ultimate beneficiaries of transactions may differ from those the
parties have anticipated ex ante. Thus the application of varying distribution
rules may result in the parties entering into sub-optimal transactions, and
43See Jean-Michel Lucheux, Draft Bill on Reorganization, Projet de Loi de Sauvegarde des Entreprises, at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/france/Draft Bill-France.pdf.
44See C. COM., art. 620-1.
"See Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine Sordino, The New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law in
France: Ten Years Later, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 437, 453 (1996).
46 See § 156-59 InsO.
47See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2300-01; West-
brook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, supra note 20, at 514-15.
"See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2301.
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leave them poorer than they would have been otherwise.49
The procedure developed to reduce the inefficiencies of a universalist in-
solvency system is to authorize the commencement and prosecution of secon-
dary cases to liquidate local assets and protect local creditors in a particular
country. Secondary cases are territorial, for the most part, under both the
EU Regulation and the Model Law.
50
In this debate I defend the modified version of universalism with qualifi-
cations. With recommended improvements, I believe that universalism's eco-
nomic impact is far better than territorialism's, including Professor LoPucki's
cooperative" version.
B. TERRITORIALISM
Territorialism is the view that a bankruptcy case should be used only to
administer the domestic assets of a multinational debtor under domestic law
for the benefit of domestic creditors, whether through reorganization or liqui-
dation.5l According to this view, assets located abroad should be adminis-
tered in their own cases in the countries where they are located,52 without
much regard for the enterprise as a whole.53 For a long time, territorialism
was the dominant approach of national bankruptcy laws. This was the domi-
49
To illustrate how universalism is supposed to work, Professor LoPucki invites us to assume that
DaimlerBenz (now DaimlerChrysler AG) has filed a bankruptcy case in Germany. See LoPucki, Global
and Out of Control, at 79-80. The German court, he says, would administer all of the company's assets in
the U.S., as well as in other countries, under the laws of Germany. German law would govern the priori-
ties of U.S. employees and customers, and U.S. courts would be required to enforce the German court
orders. See id.
This dramatic scenario is unlikely, however, for two very important reasons. First, like any well-
advised corporation, DaimlerChrysler has separately incorporated its U.S. operations, as well as those in
each of the other countries where it does business. Indeed, DaimlerChrysler operates through nearly a
thousand subsidiaries and affiliates. See Statement of Investments in affiliated, associated and related Com-
panies of DaimlerChrysler AG (DCAG) at December 31, 2004 according to § 313(2) HGB (German
Commercial Code), at http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/dccom/Investor Relations/Reports/Subsidiary
List Group 2004.pdf. Thus likely it would take a U.S. bankruptcy case to handle the insolvency of the
U.S. DaimlerChrysler business, and U.S. law would determine the rights of the employees and customers,
even those dealing with Mercedes automobiles sold in the United States.
A second reason that the German case and German court would not determine the rights of U.S.
employees and customers is that a secondary case or cases would surely be filed in the United States if
there are no U.S. main cases for the U.S. subsidiaries. See notes 131-49 infra and accompanying text. The
secondary cases would administer U.S. assets and deal with U.S. problems relating to employees and
customers.
5°See infra notes 137-43 and accompanying text (the EU Regulation); notes 144-54 and accompanying
text (the Model Law).
SSee LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 742-43.
"See id. at 742.
"See, e.g., In re Board of Dirs. Of Multicanal S.A., 314 B.R. 486, 522 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (describ-
ing traditional territorialism).
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
nant view in the United States until at least the 1970s.5 4 Similarly, Japan's
three principal bankruptcy laws were thoroughly territorial until 1999, after
which a tide of change swept territorialism out of its insolvency laws
altogether.
55
Briefly, the defects of territorialism are as follows. First, the bankruptcy
costs for an international business are enormously multiplied by the necessity
of a parallel insolvency case in each country where assets are located5 6 Each
jurisdiction requires separate administration, separate filing and evaluation of
claims, and separate prosecution of relevant litigation57 Second, reorganiza-
tion is much more difficult to achieve in a territorialist regime because it
decreases liquidation values and makes coordination of cases extremely com-
plex. 5 8 Third, conflicts between jurisdictions and courts can easily develop.
Fourth, creditors cannot know in advance where the debtor's assets will be
located when bankruptcy intervenes, which causes a less efficient ex ante
allocation of capital5 9 Fifth, distribution results are both uneven, violating
the bankruptcy principle of treating similarly situated creditors equally,6° and
unpredictable, increasing the cost of capital because of the uncertain outcome
if insolvency supervenes. 6' Finally, under territorialism, both the debtor and
individual creditors can engage in strategic behavior to advance their private
interests at the expense of the general interests of creditors.
62
1. "Cooperative" Terri torialism
Professor LoPucki does not directly confront these criticisms of territori-
alism. Instead, he proposes a "cooperative territorialism," which he claims
will ameliorate these problems. The proposed amelioration does not work.
Professor LoPucki's version of territorialism qualifies the concept in three
respects. 63 First, an asset is located in a country, for the purposes of bank-
54See Charles D. Booth, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies: An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsis-
tent Approaches of United States Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. LJ. 135, 139-47 (1992).
5"See generally, Samuel L. Bufford & Kazuhiro Yanagida, Civil Rehabilitation and Corporate Reorganiza
tion Law in Japan, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (describing the new Civil Rehabilitation
Law and Corporate Reorganization Law in Japan).
56See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2309; Anderson,
supra note 31, at 698-99.
See, e.g., Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2309.
55 ee, e.g., id.; Guzman, supra note 20, at 2202-04.
59See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 20, at 2179 (stating the benefits of universalism, in contrast to territori-
alism); Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 31, at 788-806.
6 See, e.g., Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, In-
stitutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAW & POL'v INT'L Bus. 1037, 1043 (1997).
"iSee id.
62See Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2309-11.
6 'See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 742-49. Professor LoPucki
includes a fourth discussion, that cooperative territorialism will eliminate tensions between countries and




ruptcy administration, only if that country has de facto power over the as-
set.64 Second, the host country may freely discriminate against foreign
creditors.65 Third, a transfer of assets abroad by the debtor is treated as a
transfer to a different entity.
66
According to Professor LoPucki, such a regime would establish a founda-
tion for "cooperation among courts and representatives that will be mutually
beneficial in each case."67 The cooperation "contemplated7 includes (1) "es-
tablishment of procedures for replicating claims among the cases in various
jurisdictions," 68 (2) sharing distribution lists to make sure that no creditor
receives more than full payment on its claim,69 (3) joint sale of assets when it
would be advantageous, 70 (4) "the voluntary investment by representatives in
one country in the debtor's reorganization effort in another,"7' and (5)
"seizure and return of assets that have been the subject of avoidable
transfers."7
2
Professor LoPucki states that there are two ways to achieve cooperation.
First, countries will need to cooperate on a variety of matters through treaty
or convention.73 However, the history of bankruptcy treaties gives us little
reason for optimism that a treaty or convention is likely to be developed to
assist in cooperation under a territorial regime.74 The only treaties with any
consequential effect have been isolated.7
5
The second method of cooperation, according to Professor LoPucki, is
that his version of cooperative territorialism "is designed to serve as a founda-
tion for, and to encourage, mutually beneficial cooperation by the representa-
tives of particular bankruptcy estates."76 However, examples abound of the
64See id. at 743-44.
65See id. at 744-48. Professor LoPucki does not state clearly how foreign creditors are to be treated. It
may be that he thinks they may be excluded altogether.
66See id. at 748-49. Professor LoPucki states that implementing this rule would require treaties pro-
viding for the return of fleeing assets. See id. at 749. He optimistically believes that negotiating treaties of
this sort would not be difficult; however, I would be very surprised to see such a treaty anywhere in the
world in my lifetime.






"3See id. at 742. See also id. at 758-59 (admitting that the problem of strategic removal of assets before
bankruptcy is a greater problem under a territorial regime than under a universalist regime).
74See generally, BUFFORD, supra note 12, at 53-54 (noting that there have been few international
treaties regulating transnational insolvency cases); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Bankruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA. L.
REv. 58, 61-68 (1944) (cataloguing European insolvency treaties up to 1948).
"'See generally, Nadelmann, supra note 74, passim.
76See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 742.
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lack of cooperation by courts applying territorialist laws, and examples of
cooperation are virtually unknown.
The Japanese Maruko case is a good example of the failure of territorial-
ism.77 Under the territorial regime then in place in Japan, the Japanese court
could not enjoin a foreclosure on a major resort development on the Gold
Coast of Australia. 78 In addition, an Australian bankruptcy case would not
immediately stop the pending foreclosure because the automatic stay in Aus-
tralia did not apply to secured creditors. 79 The value in the Australian prop-
erty (as well as properties in Canada) was protected only by the filing of a
Chapter 11 case in the United States. Because the lenders with security
interests in the Australian property did substantial business in the United
States, they decided to honor the U.S. automatic stay with respect to both
the Australian and the Canadian properties. 80 The properties were sold for
their economic values, the lenders were paid in full, and the universalist solu-
tion provided by U.S. bankruptcy law achieved a much larger return for cred-
itors than could be achieved through the territorial Japanese law.
Professor LoPucki provides little reason to think that any cooperation
would actually take place if his view is adopted. He points to no induce-
ments that would lead to any such cooperation. Essentially none of this kind
of cooperation has taken place in the past, and Professor LoPucki gives no
reason why his kind of territorialism would be any different.
Professor LoPucki argues incorrectly that the delays resulting from com-
mencing a case in each country (which alone can take several months in
France and in many other countries), obtaining the appointment of an admin-
istrator and negotiating a deal between administrators from the various coun-
tries would likely be faster than filing an ancillary proceeding outside the
country of the location of the COMI and collecting the assets.81 Under the
EU Regulation, the most completely universalist system now in place, the
opening of a main insolvency case is automatically and immediately effective
throughout the EU. 82 The administrator in the main case has community-
wide authority 83 with no further formalities.84 The substantial delays in
77
For a general description of the Maruko case, see 1 CARL FELSENFELD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY 6-36 to 6-38 (2003).
71See Shinichiro Abe, Recent Developments of Insolvency Laws and Cross-Border Practices in the
United States and Japan, 10 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 75 (2002).
79See id.
S0See id.
SSee LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 4, at 756-57.
2 See EU Regulation, arts. 16 & 17.
3An international case under the European regulation can be expedited by the appointment of a
liquidator who speaks the relevant languages. Alternatively, co-liquidators may be appointed, which may
include the liquidators in the relevant foreign cases. For example, the Dublin High Court could have
appointed Dr. Enrico Bondi, the Italian Parmalat administrator, as a co-liquidator in its Eurofood case.
"aSee EU Regulation, art. 18.1. The only exception to this rule arises in a country where a secondary
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opening a case which would be required in a territorialist system, as well as
the other delays inherent in such a system, are avoided altogether. While the
Model Law requires a court order, it essentially relies on motion practice
which can be done quite quickly in most countries. Terrritorialism, even the
cooperative kind, proceeds at a snail's pace in comparison.
Professor LoPucki argues that cooperative territorialism is in fact the sys-
tem in place in the world today.85 I disagree. Modified universalism of the
sort I describe here, but without the improvements that I recommend, is the
law in all of the major industrial countries in the world, and in all but one of
the twenty-five members of the European Union (by reason of the EU-wide
application of the EU Regulation). The last of the major industrial countries
to jettison territorialism was Japan, where it has disappeared in the last five
years.
86
Professor LoPucki also points to protocols as examples of cooperative ter-
ritorialism at work.87 However there are only twenty-five or thirty cases
where protocols have been adopted.88 Furthermore, protocols are almost uni-
versally adopted only in cases where each country involved is universalist,
and are virtually unknown in territorialist countries.
In short, Professor LoPucki proposes nothing in his "cooperative territori-
alism" to mitigate the known faults inherent in territorialism. Mainly he ar-
gues that universalism has its own problems that make it even worse. While
universalism does have problematic aspects, the balance weighs heavily on
the side of universalism as the more efficient approach to international insol-
vencies, in my view.
II. THE MODEL LAW AND THE EU REGULATION
The two major sources of law for international cooperation in transna-
tional insolvency cases are the Model Law and the EU Regulation,8 9 which
were both drafted in the 1990s and are roughly contemporaneous. The EU
Regulation, the first drafted, was originally prepared as a stand-alone treaty
proceeding (which is strictly territorial) is opened, in which case the powers of the liquidator in the main
case are subject to the secondary proceeding. See id.
"5See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 2, at 2220.
SSSee supra note 55 and accompanying text.
S7Most of the major protocols are available on the International Insolvency Institute website. See
http://www.iiiglobal.org/international/protocols.html.
"SE-mail from Bruce Leonard, President of International Insolvency Institute, to Lynn M. LoPucki and
Hon. Samuel L. Bufford (March 6, 2005 at 07:29 EST (on file with author)).
89 Professor LoPucki also refers to a third system, the American Law Institute's Transnational Insol-
vency Project under the North American Free Trade Agreement. See American Law Institute, Transna-
tional Insolvency Project: Principles of Cooperation in Transnational Insolvency Cases Among the
Members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (2003). While this project contains many good
recommendations, it has not yet been adopted as law by any country.
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for the EU Member States.90 After completion of the drafting in 1995, it
foundered on the United Kingdom's mad cow disease problem in 1996. 91 On
a separate track, UNCITRAL drafted the Model Law for adoption as inter-
nal legislation in any country, and issued it in 1997. After the promulgation
of the Model Law and the 1999 expiration of the period for signing the EU
treaty, the EU revived the EU Regulation project and promulgated it as an
EU regulation in 2000, and it became effective in 2001. Both the EU Regula
tion and the Model Law are more or less workable,92 and are actually in
operation in the world today. Professor LoPucki correctly claims that both
systems rely on a modified universalist viewpoint.93 These are two of the
major sources, he contends, of coming venue shopping that will bring untold
problems to the international bankruptcy world. I now take a closer look at
each system.
A. COMMON FEATURES OF THE MODEL LAW AND THE EU
REGULATION
Both the Model Law and the EU Regulation give primacy to an insol-
vency case that is opened in a debtor's "home country." Only that case can
be a main case, the opening of which is entitled to recognition in other coun-
tries where the Model Law or the EU Regulation is in force. All cases in
other countries subject to the Model Law or the EU Regulation are secon-
dary to this main case.
In the last decade, universalists have settled on a concept to identify the
home country of a multinational business entity. The home country, for the
purposes of a main insolvency case, is the country where the COMI of the
entity is located. This is the key concept used by the Model Law,94 the EU
Regulation95 and the NAFTA principles.96 The country where the COMI
is located is the proper location for the main case,97 and cases in other coun-
9
0°See generally, IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY 31-015 to 31-017 (2002).
9 1Mad cow disease broke out in the cattle herds in the United Kingdom in 1996, and in consequence
the continental EU countries imposed a ban on the importation of UK beef. Upset with this course of
events, the United Kingdom refused to sign the EU Insolvency Convention. See 1 FELSENFELD supra note
77, at 5-16 n.47.
92The workability of the EU Regulation is put to the test in the Eurofood and Daisytek cases. See
infra notes 16o-96 and accompanying text.
9
3There are some respects in which each of these models is not universalist. However, these factors
are largely irrelevant to the discussion in this paper.
9 4
See Model Law, art. 2(b); see generally Bob Wessels, International Jurisdiction to Open Insolvency
Proceedings in Europe, in Particular Against (Groups of) Companies 4-10 (2003), at http://
www.iiiglobal.org/country/europeanunion.html (explaining concept of COMI under EU Regulation).
9 See EU Regulation, art. 3.1.
9 6See NAFTA Principles, supra note 7.
9 See EU Regulation, art. 3.1; Model Law, art. 2(b).
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tries should generally be limited to secondary cases.98 The law governing the
insolvency case, for the most part,99 is that of the country where the COMI
is located and where the main case belongs. 100
The challenge, according to Professor LoPucki, is to determine where the
COMI is located. Both the Model Law and the EU Regulation answer this
question, at least in part. The Model Law provides: "In the absence of proof
to the contrary, the debtor's registered office ... is presumed to be the centre
of the debtor's main interests."' 0 ' The EU Regulation has a similar provi-
sion.102 Recital 13 of the preamble to the EU Regulation amplifies on this
concept as follows: "The 'centre of main interests' should correspond to the
place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regu-
lar basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties."
10 3
The EU Regulation gives critical importance to two factors in determin-
ing the location of the COMI. First, the COMI is located at the place where
the debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis,
which essentially means the place where it administers its commercial, indus-
trial or professional activities.' 0 4 Second, this is an objective test based on
what is apparent to third parties, and especially to creditors.'
05 Thus a credi-
tor's view of where the COMI is located is an important factor. Virg6s &
Schmit explain the rationale for this rule: "Insolvency is a foreseeable risk. It
is therefore important that international jurisdiction be based on a place
known to the debtor's potential creditors. This enables the legal risks which
would have to be assumed in the case of insolvency to be calculated."
0 6
Under both the Model Law and the EU Regulation, each company has a
single COMI, and can have only one main case.'
07
9 See EU Regulation, art. 3.2-3.
99 Standard rules of conflict of laws (or international private law, as the subject is known outside the
United States) should be applied in many contexts in insolvency cases, and in some instances these rules
will dictate the application of foreign law in the forum of the main case. See, e.g., In re Maxwell Communi-
cation Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1048-50 (2d Cir. 1996).
i"°See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
"oModel Law, art. 16(3).
"2 See EU Regulation, art. 3.1.
"Id. pmbl., recital 13. In EU law, the EU Regulation preambles have been treated as authoritative as
the main text of the regulation. See, e.g., In re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2004] IESC 47, at 10, available at
http://www.courts.ie/judgments.nsf.
i°4See Miguel Virg6s & Etienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings in
GABRIEL MOSS ET AL., THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND
ANNOTATED GUIDE (2003). The Virg6s & Schmit report was the principal report on the EU Conven-
tion on Insolvency Proceedings, which was converted into the EU Regulation by the substitution of
articles 44-47 (implementing the EU Regulation) for articles 43-46 and 48-55 (providing formalities for
treaty implementation).
i°sSee EU Regulation pmbl., recital 13.
i"'See id.
iO7See, e.g., Berends, supra note 5, at 355.
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Further, under both the Model Law and the EU Regulation, the COMI
analysis must be made separately for each legal entity. Except in a general
way, neither the Model Law nor the EU Regulation provides for the coordi-
nation of the insolvency cases of related entities. More specifically, neither
system authorizes the filing or opening of a main case for a particular com-
pany in a specific country because a parent company or other affiliate has
opened a main case in that country.'08 I disagree with this feature of both of
these laws; in my view, if the related entities form a group that functions as
an integrated economic unit, then venue for all of those related entities should
be proper where the collective COMI is located.109
B. THE MODEL LAW
The Model Law (and Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) is in-
voked by an application by a foreign representative for recognition of a for-
eign proceeding. 1 ° Such recognition is required if the foreign proceeding
meets the statutory definition, the foreign representative is duly authorized,
the application meets the formal requirements and it is made in the proper
court."' The court granting recognition must decide whether the foreign
proceeding at issue is a main proceeding or a non-main proceeding."12 The
foreign proceeding must be recognized as a main proceeding if the debtor's
COMI is located in that country, or as a non-main proceeding if the debtor
only has an establishment" 3 there. Typically the judge in the foreign pro-
ceeding will not have previously decided whether that proceeding is a main
proceeding.
The Model Law provides that, where a country has recognized a main
case in another country, a subsequent domestic bankruptcy case in the recog-
nizing country must be a secondary case of limited scope. Such a case is
permitted only if assets of the debtor are located in the recognizing coun-
try." 4 In general, such a subsequent secondary case may only affect the as-
"aIt appears that the European Regulation authorizes a liquidator in a main case to open a secondary
case for a related entity in the same country, notwithstanding that the related entity's COMI is located
elsewhere. See EU Regulation, art. 29 & pmbl. 19.
iOgSee infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
"'See Model Law, art. 15(1). Article 15(2) specifies the evidence that must accompany an application
for recognition.
i"iSee id., art. 17(1). An exception to mandatory recognition is provided if recognition is manifestly
contrary to the public policy of the forum country. See id. arts. 17(1) and 6.
ii 2See id., art. 17(2). If the debtor has neither its COMI nor an establishment in the country where
the foreign proceeding is pending, the proceeding falls into a third category, which is neither a main nor a
non-main proceeding.
"'The Model Law defines establishment as, "any place of operations where the debtor carries out a
non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services" Id. art. 2(f).
ii 4 See id., art. 28.
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sets in the recognizing country 15  (a clearly territorialist restriction).
However, the Model Law does not require that a previously pending case in
a recognizing country be limited to a secondary case.1 16 If a bankruptcy case
is already pending in the country recognizing a foreign main case, the Model
Law requires cooperation between the courts and the administrators in the
respective cases.
17
Secondary cases have important universalist components under the
Model Law. The Law specifies that, upon the recognition of a foreign case as
either a main or a secondary case, the court may, at the request of a qualified
foreign representative, entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor's
domestic assets to that foreign representative or another person designated
by the court." 8 However, the Model Law imposes a territorial condition on
such an order: the court must be satisfied that the interests of domestic credi-
tors are adequately protected. 119
C. THE EU REGULATION
The EU Regulation took effect on May 30, 2002 for all transnational
insolvency cases opened on or after that date in the EU countries (other than
Denmark, which exercised its right under its EU accession treaty to opt out
of the EU Regulation coverage). The EU Regulation also applies, effective
May 1, 2004, to the ten countries that joined the EU on that date.
The opening of a main case under the EU Regulation has four main conse-
quences. 120 First, the proceedings of a main case are governed by the laws of
the country where the case is opened.' 2 ' Second, a judgment opening a case
receives automatic recognition in all member states from the date that it be-
comes effective in the home state.' 2 2 Third, in principle the opening of a
main insolvency case produces the same effects in every member state as in
the home state (except as the EU Regulation provides otherwise), 2 3 except
1n"See id. The Model Law also permits the administration of foreign assets in a secondary case if they
may properly be administered under the recognizing country's insolvency laws. However, the administra-
tion of such assets is permitted only to the extent necessary to achieve cooperation and coordination with
courts and representatives in other countries. See id.
"'See id., art. 29(a)(2).
ni7 See id., art. 29.
"SSee id., art. 21(1)(e).
iigSee id., art. 22(1).
i2oSee generally, Wessels, supra note 94, at 1-2.
2 'See EU Regulation, art. 4.
122See id., art. 16.
"'By way of exception, the EU Regulation provides that local law governs contracts for the sale or
use of real property, settlement under payment or settlement systems for financial markets, contracts of
employment, and rights in real estate, ships or aircraft subject to domestic registration systems. See id.
arts. 8-11.
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in a state where a secondary case is opened.124 Fourth, again subject to the
opening of a local secondary case, the administrator in the main case may
exercise his or her powers in every EU state, including repatriating assets,
125
registering the judgment,126 and publishing notice in member states. These
effects may only be challenged in the home court for the main case.
127
In addition, a judgment opening a main case in any EU country imposes
the domestic effects of that case throughout the EU, except to the extent
that the EU Regulation provides otherwise. 128 For example, an automatic
stay or moratorium under the laws of the forum country for the main case
applies to all creditors in every EU country, 129 except as to rights in rem, 130
setoff rights' and sellers' rights based on reservation of title.
132
The EU Regulation for the most part adopts a universalist view; it in-
tends to encompass all of the debtor's assets on a world-wide basis and to
affect all creditors, wherever located.' 33 Only one main case may be opened
for a particular debtor.134 The EU Regulation is based on the principle of
mutual trust among the EU countries: 135 they trust their sister EU countries
with respect to both their insolvency laws and their court procedures.'
36
D. SECONDARY CASES
In addition to the main case for a legal entity, both the Model Law and
the EU Regulation contemplate the possibility of the filing of a secondary or
non-main case in a different country for the same legal entity.
The EU Regulation permits the opening of a secondary case in any coun-
try where the debtor has an establishment, 37 which means, "any place of
operations where the debtor carries on a non-transitory economic activity
t
24See id., art. 17.
2SSee id., art. 18.1.
126See id., art. 22.
1
27See id., art. 17.2.
2'See id., arts. 4.1, 17.1.
i29The consequences may be different under the EU Regulation if the country where the main case is
opened lacks an automatic stay. For example, under Dutch law there is no automatic stay, and a stay is
typically issued by the court. For another example, in Hungary a stay is issued only if it is approved in the
meeting of creditors. Because the exceptions in the EU Regulation appear to apply only to moratoria that
arise automatically upon the opening of a case, Article 25 may require that a stay that is not automatic
does affect rights in rem, set off rights and rights based on reservation of title.
i"'See id., art. 5.
3 'See id., art. 6.
1
32See id., art. 7.
i3 3Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 104, at 281.
1 4See id.
1 5See EU Regulation, pmbl. 22.
16See Wessels, supra note 94, at 14-15.
137See EU Regulation, art. 3.2.
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with human means and goods."1 38 The adoption of the law of the forum
country for the main case, and its exportation throughout the EU, are sub-
stantially modified if a secondary case is opened in another EU country.
139
Under the EU Regulation, cooperative territorialism governs in part the
rights of creditors and the administration of assets in a secondary insolvency
case. The secondary case is governed by the local law of the country where
it is opened.14 While the EU Regulation requires that a secondary case be a
liquidation case,141 it also authorizes the administrator in the main case to
obtain a stay of the liquidation for three months at a time,' 42 and to propose a
reorganization as authorized by the insolvency laws of the country where the
secondary case is opened.14
3
The Model Law is more complex. A court applying the Model Law
must determine whether a foreign case given recognition is a main case or a
secondary ("non-main") case. 144 A foreign case may be recognized as a secon-
dary case only if the country where it is located has an establishment of the
debtor.'4 5 For these purposes, "establishment" is defined virtually the same
way as in the EU Regulation."
46
While the EU Regulation provides for automatic recognition of a foreign
insolvency case within the EU, the Model Law provides a simple procedure
for the recognition of a case in another country, whether a main case or a
secondary case. The automatic stay or moratorium of the Model Law takes
effect in the recognizing country upon the recognition of a foreign main pro-
ceeding."47 However, the moratorium applicable upon the recognition of a
foreign main proceeding under the Model Law is the recognizing court's own
moratorium, while under the EU Regulation the applicable moratorium is
that of the home country. In addition, upon the recognition of a foreign sec-
ondary case, the recognizing court may issue an order for appropriate relief,
including a stay coextensive with the automatic stay resulting from the rec-
ognition of a foreign main case.
148
The domestic impact of the recognition of a foreign main case differs
"ISld., art. 2(h).
1'
9See id., arts. 27-38.
14°See id., art. 27.
141See id.
142See id., art. 33.
14 3See id., art. 34.1. Professor LoPucki erroneously claims that this is not permitted. See LoPucki,
Global and Out of Control, supra note 2, at 86-87.
14'See EU Regulation, art. 17(2).
145 See id., art. 17(2)(b).
146 The only difference is that the Model Law definition adds "or services" to the end of the definition,
so that the economic activity supporting an establishment may be carried out with services as well as with
goods. See id., art. 2(0.
147See id., art. 20.
148See id., art. 21(1).
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under the Model Law and the EU Regulation. Under the EU Regulation, a
bankruptcy case in a country where the debtor's COMI is not located must
be a secondary case. 149 Because a secondary case requires an establishment of
the debtor, the EU Regulation prohibits the opening of an insolvency case in
a non-COMI country where the debtor lacks an establishment. 50 In con-
trast, the Model Law permits a non-COMI country to commence an insol-
vency case under its own insolvency law where the debtor lacks even an
establishment. All that is needed, for Model Law purposes, is that the
debtor have assets in that country. 1"l
A secondary case under the Model Law is rather like a cooperative terri-
torialist case. In general, such a case is limited to the administration of the
assets located in the host country. 5 2 However, such a case may be used for
two other purposes. First, it may be used to implement cooperation and
coordination with foreign courts and representatives under the provisions of
the Model Law.' 53 Second, such a case may administer assets not in the host
country, where the host country's law provides that such assets should be
administered in a bankruptcy case in that country. 54
III. THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL VENUE SHOPPING
There are many transnational insolvency cases with natural homes that
are undisputed. It is uncontested that the main insolvency cases for the fol-
lowing international corporations were venued in the correct country:
Daewoo (Korea), LG Card (Korea), Maruko (Japan), Air Canada (Canada),
Parmalat (Italy), Swissair (Switzerland), Alstom (France), and Global
Telesystems Europe BV (Netherlands). Likewise, I know of no dispute that
the main cases for the following businesses were properly venued in the
United States: United Airlines, Global Crossing, Daisytek International, and
Global Telesystems Inc.155 Proper venue was achieved in all of these cases
without the application of the COMI analysis of the Model Law, and in
most of the cases without the application of the EU Regulation's COMI
rules. Furthermore, none of these cases needed the revisions to the COMI
analysis that I propose here.156
It is important to note the accomplishments of universalism in these cases.
Universalism permitted the coordinated collection of assets, assessment of
1
49
See id., art. 3.2.
5 'See Wessels, supra note 94, at 11.
"'See Model Law, art. 28.
'12See id., art. 28.
' See id.
'54See id.
155The proper venue for subsidiaries is a complex issue. See infra notes 216-28 and accompanying text.
156See notes 197-227 infra and accompanying text.
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claims, sale of the business including its international subsidiaries, or
whatever other procedures would lead to the successful reorganization or
liquidation of these businesses.
1' 7
As I understand it, Professor LoPucki does not contend that any of these
cases was filed in the wrong country. His position is that there are other
cases that were filed in the wrong country, and the consequences are so se-
vere that universalism should be scrapped. Professor LoPucki gives five ex-
amples of such cases: BCCI,iss Eurofood, Daisytek, Ciro del Monte and Enron
Directo. Presumably, these are the worst cases, in his view.
I address only the Eurofood and Daisytek cases. I do not defend the venue
results for the other cases because none except Enron Directo 159 was subject
to the new international rules under the Model Law and the EU Regulation
requiring that a debtor's COMI be located in the country where the main
case is opened. Before taking up Eurofood and Daiseytek-F, I look at interna-
tional venue shopping of cases into the United States.
A. INTERNATIONAL VENUE SHOPPING INTO THE UNITED STATES
Serious international venue shopping, to the extent that it takes place,
consists principally in the filing of cases in the United States. for businesses
with non-U.S. home countries. Most of Professor LoPucki's examples fall in
this category.
There has never been any law requiring, for the opening of a main case in
the United States, that the debtor's COMI be located in the United States.
An international insolvency case may take either of two paths in the United
States. One path is to open a complete main case, typically under Chapter 11
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. This path does not lead to a determination of
the debtor's COMI, because no such decision is provided for under U.S. law.
'"7Admittedly, some of these cases are not yet complete. However, international coordination in each
case has facilitated its progress to date.
15sBCCI is the case that most cried out for a universalist solution. It was a major international
banking empire that specialized in doing business in third world countries, and had business establishments
in seventy-three countries. It was incorporated in Luxembourg, and its headquarters were located in
England until a last minute move to Saudi Arabia, the home of most of its top officers. The bankruptcy
case was filed in Luxembourg, and the administrators were English. Its assets were liquidated largely
under the laws of England. Given the widely dispersed location of its business interests, this was a good
compromise under the facts of that case. The worst of all possible worlds would have been seventy-three
separate territorial insolvency cases, with seventy-three sets of administrative expenses, as Professor
LoPucki's view would have required. Neither treaties among the countries nor negotiated deals among
seventy-three administrators could have solved the problem of coordinating these cases. One English
accounting firm did the job for seventy-three countries. For a general description of the BCCI case, see 1
FELSEN ELD ET AL., supra note 77, at 6-5 to 6-13.
i59I am unable to discuss the decision of Mr. Justice Gavin Lightman in the Enron Directo case be-
cause, while it was subject to the EU Regulation, it is not reported.
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Indeed, COMI is a concept totally unknown in U.S. law until the recent
enactment of Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The second path has been to open a case ancillary to a foreign case under
§ 304, soon to be supplanted by Chapter 15. A § 304 case was clearly a
secondary case ("ancillary to foreign proceedings"), and not a main case. Sec-
tion 304 was designed to give a large measure of flexibility to a U.S. court in
coordinating such a case with one or more cases filed abroad. However,
§ 304 also had no requirement that there be a foreign main case; the foreign
case supporting the § 304 case may be any kind of insolvency case, main or
secondary.
I do not defend the present U.S. Bankruptcy Code as a model for sending
international insolvency cases to the right country for venue purposes. My
position is that the COMI rules in the Model Law and the EU Regulation,
with suitable modifications, can achieve this goal in most cases (including in
the United States under the new Chapter 15). My defense of the Model
Law will apply to the United States after Chapter 15 goes into force on
October 17, 2005.
We turn now to the Eurofood and Daisytek cases, that Professor LoPucki
contends were "venue shopped" to the wrong foreign courts. A controversy
is boiling in the European courts on the issue of the location of the COMI for
these subsidiaries of large international enterprises.
B. EUROFOOD
Parmalat was a corporate empire based in Parma, Italy that collapsed in
scandal in December, 2003. Fraudulent accounting left it with some $19
billion in debt that it could not pay, 160 and resulted in one of the largest
insolvency cases in European history. Parmalat SpA, the master holding com-
pany, commenced its case for extraordinary administration in Italy on Christ-
mas Eve 2003, the day after the Italian law on extraordinary administration
was amended to make the Parmalat case possible.161 Under the newly re-
vised Italian procedure, the debtor filed its application for extraordinary ad-
ministration with the Minister of Productive Activities. 162 On the same day,
the minister approved the Parmalat application and appointed Dr. Enrico
"6See Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan to Pay $2 Billion as Street's Bill for Bubble Soars, WALL ST. J., March
17, 2005, at Al.
'6 1As amended in 2004, the Italian law on extraordinary administration provides a spe.ial set of insol-
vency procedures for a debtor with 1000 employees and debts of _100 billion. See Decree-Law no. 347,
December 23, 2003, Gazz. Uff. no. 298 of December 24, 2003, § 1 ('Law no. 347/2003"), as amended.
There are approximately six companies (notably including Fiat) in Italy that meet these conditions. For a
general description and criticism of the 2004 changes, see Lucio Ghia, The Italian Legislation Provided for
the Parmalat Case Under a Critic Point of View, at http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/italy/parmalat.pdf
(last visited May 11, 2005).
16See Law No. 347/2003, as amended.
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Bondi as administrator. Pursuant to the statute, on December 27, 2003 the
local court in Parma confirmed that Parmalat SpA was insolvent and opened
its extraordinary administration case. 163 Eventually, the Parma court opened
similar extraordinary administration cases for sixty-six Parmalat entities.'
64
Among the Parmalat cases, the principal venue dispute has arisen in the
Eurofood case.
165
Eurofood, which was not included in the initial Parmalat extraordinary
administration filing, is a relatively smal1 66 Irish subsidiary that served as a
financing arm for other Parmalat subsidiaries in Venezuela and Brazil. On
January 27, 2004, a month after the initial Parmalat filing, certain Eurofood
creditors filed an involuntary winding up case (which qualified as a case gov-
erned by the EU Regulation)' 67 in the high court in Dublin, Ireland.168 The
Dublin court appointed Pearse Farrell as temporary liquidator, and set a fur-
ther hearing at which all interested parties could be heard.
Thirteen days after the filing of the Eurofood-Dublin petition (a Mon-
day), Bondi sought an order from the Italian Minister of Productive Activi-
ties for extraordinary administration of Eurofood in Italy. 169 The Minister
approved the application the same day and appointed Bondi as Eurofood's
administrator. The next day, Bondi filed a case for Eurofood in Parma. After
business hours the following Friday, Bondi gave Farrell notice that the Parma
court would hold a hearing the next Tuesday noon in Parma.' 70 Bondi re-
16See In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., decision of February 20, 2004, Parma Trib. Civ. & Pen. (It.)
("Eurofood-Parma") (English translation on file with author). I consider here four court decisions on
Eurofood: Eurofood-Parma, the decision of the Italian court of first instance in Parma; Trib. ammin. reg.
Lazio, sez. III, 16 luglio 2004, n.6998, Foro It. 2004, III, available at http://www.bitinia.com/foroitaliano/
fascicol/cop.dic4.htm ("Eurofood.Italy") (English translation on file with author); In re Eurofood IFSC
Ltd., 2004 No. 33 cos (Dublin High Court, 2004) (on file with author) ('Eurofood-Dublin"); and In re
Eurofood IFSC Ltd., [2004] IESC 47, at http://www.org/ie/cases/IESC/2004/47.htm ("Eurofood-Ire-
land"), the Irish Supreme Court decision on appeal from Eurofood-Dublin.
164Parmalat.related cases were also eventually filed in other countries, including a Chapter 11 case and
various types of litigation in the United States. See Grant Thornton Int'l v. Parmalat Finanziaria SpA (In
re Parmalat Finanziaria SpA), 320 B.R. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
i"'Some controversy has also arisen with respect to five Dutch Parmalat entities (Parma Food Corp.
B.V., Dairies Holding International B.V., Parmalat Capital Netherlands B.V., Parmalat Finance Corp. B.V.
and Parmalat Netherlands B.V.) and two Luxembourg Parmalat entities (Olex S.A. and Parmalat Soparfi
S.A.). The Parma court opened extraordinary administration cases for these entities on largely the same
grounds as for Eurofood. See, e.g., Bob Wessels, The EC Insolvency Regulation: Three Years in Force 5
(on file with the author); Financial Restructuring Alert, March 26, 2004 at http://www.akingump.com/
docs/publication/657.pdf (last visited May 24, 2005).
166OUt of a total Parmalat debt of some $19 billion, Eurofood owed approximately US$122 million to
Parmalat creditors, which was all guaranteed by Parmalat International, SpA.
i67The EU Regulation specifies which kinds of national insolvency cases in the various EU countries
qualify for its application. See EU Regulation, art. 2(a) and Annex A. A winding up case under Irish law
is such a case.
iS'See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 163, at slip opinion 3.
169See id. at 8-10.
i
7
0See id. at 9.
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fused to provide Farrell copies of the moving papers, and the notice was
insufficient to permit him to appear and defend in any reasonable manner.
171
Meanwhile, Bondi gave no notice at all to the Eurofood creditors and they
were unable to appear at the hearing.172 The Parma court opened a main
insolvency case for Eurofood three days later.173 The Dublin court, in con-
trast, proceeded at a more deliberate pace to assure that all of the parties in
interest had an opportunity to be heard before deciding whether its case
qualified as a main case. 174 The Dublin court decided that the Parma court
acted without jurisdiction and that recognition of its decision to open a main
case for Eurofood violated Irish public policy because the Parma court failed
to observe due process principles.17 5 Both the Parma and the Dublin deci-
sions were appealed.
The Italian appellate court rejected appeals of the Eurofood-Parma deci-
sion by both Farrell and Bank of America in a decision published on July 16,
2004.176 The court found that the opening of an Italian extraordinary admin-
istration case is a two-step process: first, the minister's issuance of a decree
admitting a company into extraordinary administration, and second, the
court's finding that the debtor is insolvent and setting procedures for the
case. 177 For Eurofood, these steps took place on February 9 and February 20,
2004. The court further found that no case for Eurofood had been opened in
Ireland at that time, for the purposes of automatic recognition under the EU
Regulation. The Dublin high court decision of January 27 was too limited to
constitute the "opening" of a case, because the Dublin court had only ap-
pointed a provisional liquidator as a precautionary measure without going
into the merits even in a summary manner.' 78 The Italian appellate court
found that the March 15 Dublin decision, even if retroactive, could not take
precedence over the February decisions in Italy, which were already in full
effect.179
'7"See id. at 10-11.
1
72See id. at 9-10, 31.
17'Under Decree-Law no. 347/2004, the court is required to issue its decision on the opening of an
extraordinary administration case within fifteen days of the decision by the Minister of Productive Activi.
ties. See id., § 4.1. Thus the Parma court could have taken eleven more days (which included a weekend)
before issuing its decision. Apparently the court did not take the extra time because the next hearing in
the Dublin court was scheduled on the day before the fifteen days expired. See Eurofood.Ireland, supra
note 163, at 18 ("it is not contested that the Parma Court was determined to proceed with the hearing on
17th February and to render its decision before the Irish High Court could make a windingup order .. .).
1
74Under Irish winding up law, there is no "opening" event, apart from the filing itself, that could have
occurred before the decision of the Parma court to open an Italian main case for Eurofood.
i7'See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 163, at 21-33.
176See EurofoodIaly, supra note 163.
i77Se id. at 12-14.
17See id. at 10,11.
179See id. at 12.
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The appellate court further found that the Italian legislature properly
enacted legislation to deal with the financial crises of large groups of compa-
nies "that are global both in orientation and in location" 80 and granted the
Minister of Productive Activities the power to admit a company into ex-
traordinary administration solely on the basis of its control relationship with
its parent, to promote the uniform reorganization of companies in a group
that are collectively caught up in a parent corporation's financial difficulty.1s
81
The appellate court rejected the bank's challenge to the admission of
Eurofood into extraordinary administration without notice to creditors, on
the grounds that the minister's decree to admit Eurofood into extraordinary
administration was a matter of utmost urgency that could not await formali-
ties of notice,' 8 2 and that in any event the initiation of a bankruptcy case is
not subject to objection by creditors.'
8 3
Eleven days later on July 27, 2004, the Irish Supreme Court affirmed the
Dublin court, insofar as the decision was based on Irish law.' 84 Insofar as the
Dublin court's decision was based on the EU Regulation, the Irish Supreme
Court referred the matter to the European Court of Justice,18 5 where it re-
mains pending.'8
6
C. THE FRENCH AND GERMAN DAISYTEK CASES
Daisytek was a corporate group based in the United States whose cash
flow problems led to the filing of nine cases in Dallas and sixteen in Leeds,
England. Of the English filers, three companies were German and one was
French. The high court in Leeds issued a "first day order" finding that the
COMI for fourteen of the sixteen companies, including the four French and
German subsidiaries, was in England, and that each case was a main case.'
8 7
Notably, no appeal was taken from this decision.
Shortly after the filing of the Daisytek case in Leeds, the French manage-
ment for SAS ISA-Daisytek ("Daisytek-F") filed an insolvency case in the
commercial court in Pontoise, France, principally to avoid the risk of personal
liability for corporate debts after its cessation of payments.' 88 Three days
'8 See id. at 15.
"'See id.
"2 See id. at 24.
"S3 See id.
"4 See Eurofood.ITeland, supra note 163, at 17.19.
"'See id. at 11-13.
"'6 See Case C-341/04, Bondi v. Bank of America (In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd.), at http://cu-
ria.eu.int.juris (acknowledging the filing of the questions referred by the Irish Supreme Court); see also
Case C-341/04, Bondi v. Bank of America (In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd.), at http://curia.eu.int/juris (Sept.
15, 2004) (denying urgent review of the issues referred to the ECJ).
"'See In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562, [2004] B.P.I.R. 30, 2003 WL 21353254, at *1.
The court deferred a ruling on the remaining two cases at the request of debtors' counsel. See id.
iS'See C. COM. art. L. 625-5.5. "Cessation of payments" is defined in the French insolvency law as the
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later, following the intervening weekend, the Pontoise court found that the
Leeds court had not validly opened a main case on the grounds that the Leeds
court had impermissibly based its decision as to the Daisytek-F COMI on the
location of the COMI of its parent company in England. 189 Accordingly, the
Pontoise court opened its own main case for Daisytek-F 9° and denied a sub-
sequent application of the English administrator to intervene. 191
The French court of appeal in Versailles, reversing the decision of the
commercial court in Pontoise, held that the EU Regulation required the rec-
ognition of the opening of the main Eurofood case in Leeds.19 2 After examin-
ing the text of the Leeds decision which was presented to the court both in
its English original and in an authenticated translation, the court of appeal
found as a procedural matter that the Leeds court considered all of the proper
factors in determining that the Daisytek-F case was a main case.' 93 Thus, the
court of appeal ruled, a French court was not permitted to second-guess the
substance of the Leeds decision, and was required to recognize the English
decision opening a main case. 194
The decision of the court of appeal in Versailles is on review at the
French Cour de Cassation (the French supreme court) at the request of the
Ministry of Justice, which appeared as a party in interest beginning in the
Pontoise court. No other party has sought review. It is expected that the
Ministry of Justice will request that the Cour de Cassation refer the matter
to the European Court of Justice.
Three days after the filing of the sixteen cases in Leeds, the German busi-
ness manager of the German Daisytek subsidiaries filed motions in the Dussel-
dorf county court 195 for the opening of insolvency cases for those
subsidiaries, but failed to inform the court of the pending Leeds cases. After
being informed of the Leeds cases for the German Daisytek subsidiaries, on
July 10, 2003, the Dfisseldorf court opened competing main cases for the two
German operating companies, ISA Deutschland GmbH and Supplies Team
GmbH, and on August 1, 2003 it opened a secondary case for the German
holding company PAR Beteiligungs GmbH. The English insolvency adminis-
moment in time when the debtor -is unable to meet its current liabilities from its liquid assets.- See id., art.
L. 621-1.
" See In re SAS ISA-Daisytek, Trib. Comm. Pontoise, 6ime ch., May 26, 2003 (on file with author),
at 3.
'9°See id. By French standards, the decision to open a main case for Daisytek-F was unusually quick.
Normally it takes ten to fourteen days to open a case based on a voluntary filing.
'9'See Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SAS, [2003] B.C.C. 984, [2004] I.L. Pr. 6 (Versailles Ct. App.), 2003
WL 22936778, at *3.
'92 See id. at *6-7.
"'See id. at *6.
'94 See id. at *6,7.




trator filed an extraordinary complaint against the German opening of the
competing main cases, which the county court denied and referred up to the
district court. Three months later the district court reversed the denial of
the extraordinary complaint and remanded the cases to the county court for
further proceedings. In due course, the county court closed the main insol-
vency cases for the two operating companies on March 12, 2004, and opened
secondary cases for them.196 Thus only secondary cases for the German
Daisytek subsidiaries are now open in Germany, which is consistent with the
EU Regulation.
IV. IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE MODEL LAW AND THE
EU REGULATION
Neither the Model Law nor the EU Regulation creates a perfect world
from the modified universalist perspective. Indeed, the application of the EU
Regulation to date shows that both it and the Model Law need three im-
provements to make them workable in a modified universalist framework.
The first major improvement needed is the adoption of procedures gov-
erning a decision on the location of the debtor's COMI, which in turn deter-
mines the country where a main case should be located. In particular, this
decision needs to be decoupled from the decision to open an insolvency case
and other "first day" orders, and the procedures need to provide for a fair
venue hearing on notice to all creditors and other interested parties.
Second, both the EU Regulation and the Model Law need amendment to
provide for the filing in the same venue for the insolvency cases of all the
members of a corporate group that constitute an integrated economic unit.
Third, to inhibit venue shopping, these laws should be amended to impose a
.residency" rule requiring a corporation or corporate group to reside in a
country for a period of time (perhaps six months) before it qualifies to file a
main case in that country. Here I examine each of these recommendations in
greater detail.
A. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING COMI
Many of the venue problems that have arisen in the administration of the
international insolvency cases in recent years result from inadequate procedu-
ral rules. This inadequacy is particularly important in the decisions on the
location of the COMI in the Eurofood and Daisytek-F cases. The timing of
such a decision needs to be delayed to a certain extent, so that the quality of
the evidence for the decision can be improved and the parties in interest can
be heard.
1
9 6 See AG D~isseldorf, Daisyte(/Supplies Team, Decision of March 12, 2004 (on file with author).
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1. Timing of the Decision on Whether a Case is a Main Case
The determination whether a transnational insolvency case is a main case,
based on the location of the COMI, tends to be made at the outset of a case,
within a few days of its filing. In a civil law country, this decision is typically
made at the same time as the decision opening the case. In a common law
country, the decision is frequently included in the 'first day order" package.
The decision whether a case is a main case is too important an issue in a
transnational insolvency case to decide it at the outset before all of the par-
ties in interest have an opportunity to be heard. The result of such a deter-
mination is substantial-it determines the country where the main case will
proceed and which country's laws will for the most part govern the rights of
creditors and other interested parties in the case. This decision needs careful
consideration after all of the interested parties have been provided notice and
an opportunity to be heard. Neither the EU Regulation nor the Model Law
provides a procedure to assure notice to the interested parties and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before the decision on this issue is made.
The Dublin high court followed appropriate procedures in its Eurofood
case to assure that all of the parties in interest would have notice of the
hearing on the determination whether its case was a main case, that they
would have sufficient time to prepare and present the relevant information
for this determination, and that they would have a full and fair opportunity
to present their views to the court. The court took a month and a half for
briefing and hearings on this issue, and issued its ruling nearly two months
after the initial filing of the case. 197 In the interim, the Italian court in Parma
was rushing through a decision that its Eurofood case was a main case, based
on a highly questionable finding that Eurofood's COMI was located in
Italy.Y9 8
Neither of the Daisytek-F decisions to open a main case provided even as
much notice and opportunity to be heard as the Parma court provided in
Eurofood. In Leeds, the first day of hearings included decisions to open main
cases for fourteen Daisytek affiliates. Apparently, the French creditors re-
ceived" no notice in the Daisytek-F case filed in England. Furthermore,
Daisytek-F's employees also received no notice in that case even though
French law requires such notice. Indeed, the only evidence provided to the
Leeds court was an extensive affidavit from the corporate manager in
England. 199
Similarly, there was no notice given to the English administrators or to
any creditors before the Commercial Court in Pontoise ordered the opening
1
9 7See Euwofood.Dublin, supra note 163.
198 See Eurofood-Parma, supra note 163.
199See In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., supra note 187, at *1-4.
(Vol. 79
GLOBAL VENUE CONTROLS
of a main case in France for Daisytek-F. The English administrators appeared
afterwards on a motion to intervene, which the Pontoise court denied.
200
My view is that a decision on the "main case" issue should be delayed
approximately a month after notice of the filing is given to creditors, to pro-
vide both notice of a hearing on this issue and an opportunity for all of the
parties in interest to be heard. Under the EU Regulation, this procedural
problem cannot be solved at the national level. However, it can be solved at
the EU level by supplementing the EU Regulation with procedural rules
that assure a reasonable degree of procedural fairness to the parties, or "due
process," as we call it in the United States.
The Model Law provides no better procedural rules than the EU Regula-
tion on the determination whether a case is a main case. The Model Law
focuses on the recognition of foreign cases, and the treatment of domestic
cases thereafter in the recognizing state. However, the Model Law is silent
on the procedure for recognizing a foreign case as a main case.20 1 Moreover,
the Model Law makes no provision for determining whether a domestic case
is a main case.
Like the EU Regulation, the Model Law needs an international solution
to provide for procedural rights of the parties in interest on a decision that a
case is a main case. UNCITRAL would be the logical international body to
propose such procedures. These procedures should be adopted by a country
in connection with its domestic adoption of the Model Law itself, to assure
that a decision recognizing a foreign case as a main case, or determining that a
domestic case is a main case, is made only after the due process rights of the
parties in interest have been respected.
Procedural rules on the decision to declare a case a main insolvency case
need to include both a right to be heard and a right to notice.20 2 Under the
Italian rules applicable to the Italian Eurofood case, for example, creditors
were not recognized as parties in interest on the decision to declare the case a
main case,203 and thus they had no right to be heard. While the Parma court
ordered the Italian administrator Bondi to give notice to the interested par-
ties, he only gave belated notice to the Irish provisional liquidator and gave
"°See Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SAS, supra note 191, at *3.
20'See Berends, supra note 5, at 352.
2°2See, e.g., Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 163, at 17-19 (finding that the Irish liquidator was not given
fair notice of the Parma hearing sufficient to permit him to participate meaningfully and was improperly
denied copies of the papers presented to the Parma court).
2°3See Tommaso Manferoce, Gli Organi, Gli Effetti e lAccertarnento del Passivo 103.3 in IL FALUi
MENTO E LE ALTRE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALi 263 (Luciano Panzani ed. 2003); Lucio Ghia, The Italian
Legislation Provided for the Parmalat Case Under a Critic Point of View, at http://www.iiiglobal.or/coun.
try/italy/parmalat.pdf (last visited May 24, 2005) ('the creditors have been deprived of their rights of
credits" in the amended statute enacted for the Parmalat case).
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no notice at all to Eurofood's three creditors, who apparently would have
participated in the Italian hearing if they had been given the opportunity.
2. Quality of Evidence on COMI Presented to the Court of First
Instance
The nature and quality of the evidence supporting a decision to open a
main case is very important. Of the various Eurofood and Daisytek cases dis-
cussed here, the high court in Dublin was the only first instance court with
quality evidence to support this decision. While the Dublin court appointed
a temporary liquidator on an ex parte motion based only on an unopposed
affidavit of the managing director of Bank of America,204 it postponed for two
months the decision whether the case qualified as a main case so that the
Italian administrator would have a full and fair opportunity to be heard.
The Leeds decision to open a main case for Daisytek-F does not disclose
the evidence to supports its decision. It is fair to assume, however, that this
decision was unopposed, and that the court based its decision solely on a
fairly detailed affidavit from the chief executive officer of Daisytek-ISA Ltd.,
the top level English holding company for the European Daisytek enterprise,
that was filed with the bankruptcy petition.205 It is also fair to assume that
the Leeds court gave no opportunity to controvert this evidence. The court
made this decision without giving notice or an opportunity to be heard to the
French creditors and other parties in interest.20 6 Notably, no notice was
given to the 145 French employees, who had substantial rights under French
law, including the right to be heard before the opening of an insolvency
case207 and the right to a representative in the insolvency process.208 Finally,
it is fair to assume that the court did not give much time to hearing or exam-
ining the evidence as to Daisytek-F, because the court made similar decisions
in fourteen Daisytek cases that day.209 Similarly, the Parma court based its
decision in Eurofood on extensive papers that Bondi filed, including nineteen
exhibits, which he never provided to the Irish liquidator.
210
The French commercial court that decided to open a competing main case
for Daisytek-F had somewhat more, albeit also one-sided, evidence in support
of its decision. Bruce Robinson, the Daisytek-F president, presented a decla-
ration in writing, and orally confirmed, that the high court in Leeds had
opened a bankruptcy case for Daisytek-F, and that the company was in a
204See Eurofood.Dublin, supra note 163, at 6.






Sce C. COM. art. L. 621-4.
2°SSee id.
2°9Indeed, in the court's eighteen paragraph decision on the fourteen applications, only paragraph 17
addresses the facts concerning Daisytek-F's COMI.
2 "See Eurofood-Dublin. supra note 163, at 32.
(Vol. 79
GLOBAL VENUE CONTROLS
state of cessation of payments. 211 Philippe Kersebet, speaking on behalf of
the employees, explained that the workforce was restless because of the open-
ing of the case in Leeds, and because relations with suppliers were deteriorat-
ing.212 The Daisytek-F financial director also presented evidence on the
tenuous state of the finances of the business. 213 Finally, the public prosecutor
opined that the financial situation of the company was extremely tenuous and
that it was close to liquidation.214 The court did not hear from the adminis-
trators appointed in the Leeds case until the next month, when they filed
third party proceedings to join the French case; the court promptly dismissed
the application.
Thus, except in Dublin, all of the evidence presented in the courts of first
instance in the Eurofood and Daisytek cases consisted of unopposed declara-
tion and statements presented in ex parte proceedings where possible oppo-
nents were given either no notice whatever (Leeds and Pontoise) or
insufficient notice to present an opposition (Parma). Failing to provide an
opportunity for opposition, those courts certainly lacked a balanced presenta-
tion of the evidence on the location of the COMIs at issue, and much impor-
tant evidence was likely not presented. It thus should come as no surprise
that their decisions may be questionable. The adoption of procedures to give
timely notice and an opportunity to be heard will vastly improve the quality
of evidence presented to a court making a decision on whether a case should
be a main case based on the location of the debtor's COMI.
This issue admittedly arises only under a universalist approach to trans-
national insolvency cases. Working out appropriate procedures for a determi-
nation that a case is a main case is one of the burdens of universalism. For a
territorialist approach, there is no role for a decision to recognize a foreign
case as either a main case or a foreign case, because a foreign case has no
official status or recognition. Professor LoPucki leaves it to treaties and pri-
vate initiative to solve the problems of coordination among such case. I con-
sider this approach unsatisfactory.215
B. CORPORATE GROUPS
Professor LoPucki correctly points out that virtually all multinational
corporate empires are corporate groups, not single corporations, and indeed
there are often hundreds of legally separate entities. 216 Some of them operate




2 15See text at notes 63-88 supra.
2 16See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, supra note 2, at 92. Professor LoPucki's illustration based
on the hypothetical insolvency of DaimlerBenz (now DaimlerChrysler AG) misses the point because
DaimlerChrysler is a corporate group consisting of nearly a thousand separate entities.
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independent businesses, he points out, while others are integral parts of a
larger business operation, and still others fall in between.217
Neither the EU Regulation nor the Model Law addresses the problem of
corporate groups. Each is drafted on the assumption that every legal entity
must be evaluated separately to determine where its COMI is located, which
is the proper venue for its main insolvency case.218 This approach is unsatis-
factory, because a corporate group that is an integrated economic unit can
only be reorganized or liquidated efficiently if it is done collectively for the
entire group.
Professor LoPucki's solution to the problem of corporate groups is exactly
correct. The sensible solution, he says, is to administer economically inte-
grated219 group members in the home country of the integrated group, and to
administer economically independent group members separately in their own
home countries. 220 The Italian court of appeal took essentially the same posi-
tion in Eurofood-Italy, where it stated, "there is an obvious and undeniable
need not to dissipate the economic worth underlying the Group, which can-
not be effectively realized without a single insolvency procedure and uniform
management of each and every business, irrespective of the scale of the sub-
sidiary enterprises. 221 Professor LoPucki's problem is that he cannot arrive at
the sensible solution from his cooperative territorial position while I can get
there from a modified universalist view. 222 Here is a sketch of how such a
rule could operate.
The universalist solution is to modify the COMI definition to provide
that the corporate group venue decision be based on the collective COMI of
all of the legal entities that operate together as an integrated economic unit.
Thus where two or more companies are economically integrated and operate
as a single economic group, the COMI decision for the corporate group
would displace a decision based on the COMI of the separate legal entities.
In contrast, where a company is not integrated into the group as a single
economic unit, the court should decide its proper venue separately based on
2 i7See id.
2 1 See, e.g., Wessels, supra note 94, at 18-20 (stating that the EU Regulation provides no rule for
groups of affiliated companies); Robert van Galen, The European Insolvency Regulation and Groups of
Companies, at http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european union/articles.pdf (proposing revisions to the
EU Regulation to provide for joint bankruptcy cases for corporate groups.
2 91 agree with Professor LoPucki that "economic integration" is not a legal term of art, and needs
better definition. I have borrowed it from Professor LoPucki, and have tried to put some flesh on its
bones.
22.See LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, at 93-94. For a similar proposal, although somewhat
different in its details, see van Galen, supra note 218.
22iEurofood.Italy, supra note 163, at 25.
"22Accord, Westbrook, A Global Solution to International Default, supra note 31, at 2314-15 (stating
that territorialism is less able to cope with the problems of international business life because "it turns on a
territorial model of economic conduct that is outdated on its way to obsolete").
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the location of its COMI, as the EU Regulation and the Model Law now
provide.
It is much harder to manipulate the COMI of a corporate group than it is
to manipulate the COMI of a particular corporation. 223 This is especially
true for the large corporate groups that interest Professor LoPucki. Moving
the COMI of a corporate group such as General Motors, IBM or General
Electric would be a formidable task. Furthermore, the possibility of filing
secondary cases in those countries that have an establishment substantially
ameliorates the procedural difficulties of a foreign main case. Thus use of the
COMI of the corporate group for bankruptcy venue purposes promotes ex
ante predictability and reduces transaction costs. In contrast, forum shopping
is much easier under a territorialist view-forum shopping can be accom-
plished simply by moving the assets of a single company to another forum.
According to my view on corporate groups, both Daisytek-F and the Ger-
man Daisytek operating subsidiaries should not have had main cases in En-
gland because they were essentially stand-alone operations except for the
activities of one manager in England. In contrast, under my approach the
Eurofood case most certainly would be properly venued in Italy, and not in
Ireland.
Admittedly, making a COMI decision for a corporate group or economic
unit will be more difficult than making such a decision for an individual legal
entity. It will be necessary first to define which legal entities form a part of
the integrated economic unit for which the COMI decision is to be made. In
contrast, if the decision is made separately for each legal entity, there is no
issue of identifying the entity in question. This decision is rather similar in
scope and difficulty to a decision that courts must now make in defining a
relevant market for the purposes of antitrust litigation, 224 and not unlike deci-
sions on the application of such concepts as due process or equal protection.
Like the relevant market'decision, the definition of the corporate group
should be decided early in the insolvency case, but not before appropriate
briefing and opportunity for the parties in interest to be heard. Courts will
need judges with suitable training to make such decisions, which may lead to
the wider adoption of specialized bankruptcy courts or the assignment of
bankruptcy cases to specialized commercial courts with appropriately trained
judges.225
22'Accord, Guzman, supra note 20, at 2214.
2 24See, e.g., Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 961-64 (6th Cir.
2004) (court must use "reasonable interchangeability" standard is ascertaining the relevant product market
to evaluate rules limiting player participation in intercollegiate basketball tournaments); Spanish Broad-
casting Sys. Of Fla., Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065, 1074 (11th Cir. 2004)
(attempted monopolization of Spanish-language radio stations).
2 25
Some countries already have specialized bankruptcy courts. These countries include the United
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Professor LoPucki claims that these standards are highly subjective. 226 I
disagree. While the application of each of these concepts depends on the
facts of each particular case, both case law and commentaries have developed
a host of guides for their application. The application of these concepts in
courts of first instance is not even subject to a rule of discretion on appeal.
Appellate courts demand objective application and do not hesitate to reverse
if courts of first instance make decisions that do not meet objective standards.
Nonetheless, some such decisions are close calls; for this reason we have
judges to make the calls. There is no role for subjective decisions on these
subjects in judicial systems, either in the United States or abroad.
My proposed rule would also not provide an easy solution for a company
that is only partially integrated into the corporate group, and may or may not
be able to operate separately. This decision would turn on the facts of the
particular case and may call for a difficult judgment by the trial judge. As the
Eurofood and Daisytek cases illustrate, this kind of decision will not likely
arise often as to entities of substantial importance. However, it is the job of a
judge to make difficult decisions, and this is no different in kind from many
other decisions that judges are routinely required to make. Furthermore,
creditors ex ante will know that they are dealing with such a company in
most cases, and will price their credit accordingly.
Professor LoPucki argues that a corporate group can easily manipulate
the location of its COMI by integrating or disintegrating its operations, or by
buying or selling major portions of its business, in contemplation of bank-
ruptcy. 227 This kind of tactic is not easy and is highly unlikely, except at the
margins, because the economic and legal consequences of such actions far ex-
ceed the impact on a bankruptcy court's determination of the COMI of the
corporate group. Buying or selling a major part of the business makes a fun-
damental change in the nature of the business, and has major (sometimes pro-
hibitive) tax consequences as well. Integrating or disintegrating a corporate
group may also expose the surviving business to liability by removing the
shield provided by separate entities and may subject it to unexpected conse-
quences resulting from different regulatory systems. These impacts are com-
plex and subtle, and are highly unlikely to be taken to change the location of a
corporate group's COMI solely for bankruptcy purposes.
States, Thailand and Slovakia. In other countries, such as Ukraine and Morocco, bankruptcy cases go to
commercial courts that handle other commercial cases, but not non-business cases. Yet others, such as
Canada and Romania, have commercial law panels in their first instance courts of general jurisdiction that
handle bankruptcy cases
2 6See LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, supra note 2, at 153-54.
227
See id. at 155-58.
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C. RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR COMI
Under the EU Regulation, the determination of the COMI, for the pur-
poses of opening a main case, is made as of the date of the opening of the
case. 228 The Model Law is less specific; a court recognizing a foreign pro-
ceeding decides whether the foreign proceeding is a main proceeding. 229 This
recognition decision does not require that the foreign court have decided this
issue, and in fact the foreign court frequently will not have addressed this
issue. For the recognition of a foreign main proceeding, the Model Law only
requires that the foreign proceeding be in fact a main proceeding. This gives
the recognizing court flexibility as to the point or period of time to which the
recognizing court should look when it makes this determination. Professor
LoPucki can rightly charge that the lack of specificity in the Model Rules,
and the EU Regulation's focus on the moment of the opening of a case,
230
create an opportunity for manipulation of the COMI in some cases. I agree
that a better rule is needed.
I recommend a residency rule for both the Model Law and the EU Regu-
lation that would specify a minimum period of time during which the COMI
must be located in a relevant venue to qualify to open a main insolvency case
there. Under such a rule, a court would not permit a change in COMI just
before filing a bankruptcy case to govern the proper international venue of a
main case. The international rules do not presently address this issue, but
they should.2
31
U.S. bankruptcy law takes this approach for the purpose of determining
the proper venue among the various states. Proper venue for a case in the
United States is the district where venue was proper for the 180 days imme-
diately preceding the filing of the case.2 32 If the district where venue would
be proper has changed during the 180-day period, the proper venue is the
alternative district which has qualified as the proper venue for a longer pe-
riod of time during the 180-day window than any other.233
Under a similar rule, a debtor would typically qualify for opening a main
case only in a country where its COMI has been located for more than six
22SSee Skjevesland v. Geveran Trading Co. (No. 3), [2003] B.C.C. 209, [2003] B.P.I.R. 73, 2002 WL
31947334, affd, [2002] EWHC 2898, [2003] B.C.C. 392, [2003] B.P.I.R. 924, 2003 WL 1610215 (Eng.);
see also Bob Wessels, Moving House: Which Court can Open Insolvency Proceedings? 4 (2003), at http://
www.iiiglobal.org/country/europeanunion/MovingHouse.pdf.
229See Model Law, art. 20.
...But see Skievesland, where, in deciding the location of the COMI for an individual, the court consid-
ered the various places where the debtor had resided during the three years before filing his bankruptcy
case.
23 1The failure to provide a residency requirement led recently to an apparent attempt to change the
location of the COMI in the Eurofood case. See Euofood-Dublin, supra note 163, at 6-7.
252See 28 U.S.C. § 1403(1) (2005).
2331d.
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months before its filing.234 Six months is not a magic term; it could be any
duration of time long enough to make it unlikely that a potential debtor
would change its COMI on the eve of bankruptcy to invoke the jurisdiction
and laws of a country different from where it has traditionally conducted its
business. Indeed, a year may be a more appropriate time period for such a
rule.
While I disagree with Professor LoPucki's view that, with no better
guide, courts will always decide to keep a large international insolvency case,
I agree that it is better to have rules to guide this decision than to leave the
decision to unfettered judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION
Venue shopping is not out of control in international insolvency cases.
While some venue shopping may occur in a handful of high profile cases, in
fact it is quite uncommon. Furthermore, the developing legal systems for the
regulation of international insolvency cases in the Model Law and the EU
Regulation include provisions that will substantially (if not completely) curb
improper venue shopping in the international arena.
I conclude that three modifications are needed to make the Model Law
and the EU Regulation work more effectively for venue purposes. First, a
court should make the decision to designate a case as a main case for a partic-
ular corporation or corporate group only after giving the parties in interest
both (1) sufficient notice, and (2) a full opportunity to be heard on the issue.
Second, the Model Law and the EU Regulation should be amended to permit
the filing in a single venue of all cases in a corporate group that constitute an
integrated economic unit. Third, a minimum residency rule for both corpora-
tions and corporate groups will also discourage inappropriate venue shopping.
At least one international court may soon issue decisions that will give
guidance on the interpretation of the EU Regulation on this subject. One
case, involving the Eurofood subsidiary of Parmalat, is pending before the
European Court of Justice, and another, involving the French subsidiary of
Daisytek, appears to be headed to that court.
Modified universalism is superior to territorialism as a system for han-
dling international insolvency cases. I especially approve of the version of
universalism embodied in the EU Regulation, which provides for the auto-
matic recognition of judgment in insolvency cases from other EU countries, if
the foregoing recommended changes are made. The Eurofood and Daisytek-F
cases, which both arose under the EU Regulation, are not counter to my
2 34Moss recommends a different approach to this problem under the EU Regulation: in the case of
undesirable forum shopping, he recommends that a court ignore steps taken purely to avoid the appropri-
ate jurisdiction. See Moss, supra note 104, at 171; accord Wessels, supra note 94, at 5.
(Vol. 79
GLOBAL VENUE CONTROLS
position. Instead, they reflect inadequate procedures for determining the lo-
cation of the COMI's of the subsidiaries at issue in those cases.
My recommendation of the EU Regulation approach is subject to one
additional condition. I do not advocate its unlimited extension except to
countries where the institutions of the home country, including its courts,
can be trusted. A foreign court must have the authority (as under both the
Model Law and the EU Regulation) to decline enforcement of a court order
from a foreign court on the grounds of public policy.
235
Absent an EU Regulation type of regime, I heartily recommend the
Model Law, again with the recommended revisions, as a solid basis for coop-
eration between countries and their courts in dealing with the insolvency
cases of international corporate groups. It embodies a version of modified
universalism that will (a) level the playing field among creditors and treat
similarly situated creditors equally, whatever their national origin; (b) lead to
less distortion in investment decisions because it is more predictable ex ante;
(c) substantially improve the return to creditors because it will substantially
reduce transaction costs in the bankruptcy process; (d) provide greater clarity
and certainty to the parties in interest in most circumstances; and (e) pro-
mote the reorganization of businesses rather than their liquidation when this
will be more beneficial to creditors and the economic community.
23 5See Model Law, art. 6; EU Regulation, art. 26.
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